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Abstract—Recent advances in predictive data analytics and
ever growing digitalization and connectivity with explosive ex-
pansions in industrial and consumer Internet-of-Things (IoT) has
raised significant concerns about security of people’s identities
and data. It has created close to ideal environment for adversaries
in terms of the amount of data that could be used for modeling
and also greater accessibility for side-channel analysis of security
primitives and random number generators. Random number
generators (RNGs) are at the core of most security applications.
Therefore, a secure and trustworthy source of randomness is
required to be found. Here, we present a differential circuit
for harvesting one of the most stochastic phenomenon in solid-
state physics, random telegraphic noise (RTN), that is designed
to demonstrate significantly lower sensitivities to other sources
of noises, radiation and temperature fluctuations. We use RTN
in amorphous SrTiO3-based resistive memories to evaluate the
proposed true random number generator (TRNG). Successful
evaluation on conventional true randomness tests (NIST tests)
has been shown. Robustness against using predictive machine
learning and side-channel attacks have also been demonstrated
in comparison with non-differential readouts methods.
I. INTRODUCTION
Generating unpredictable stream of random sequences is
crucial for many, if not all, conventional cryptographic prim-
itives such as key cryptography, digital signatures and ci-
phers. Internet-of-Things (IoT), wireless networks and radio-
frequency identification (RFID) are just a few broad, yet
sensitive, examples [1, 2]. These applications are usually
extremely limited in their power, cost and area budgets that
demands high efficiency. Due to the lack of efficient sources of
randomness, pseudo-random number generators (PRNG) have
been used in different applications and have been frequently
reported to be predictable, and hence, vulnerable to a range
of attacks [3, 4].
True randomness is usually considered an answer to the
issue of pseudo-randomness. In short, it is extremely difficult,
if not impossible, to mathematically prove “true” randomness.
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For true random number generators (TRNGs), entropy source
is a very important factor. In hardware intrinsic security, the
source has to be a physically genuine random phenomenon.
There are numerous spatiotemporal phenomena in hardware,
specially at deep-micron or nanometer scales, that have been
used as sources of randomness, and chaotic systems [3–6].
In CMOS, randomness and jitter in oscillators output [2, 7],
jitter in digital systems [8, 9], metastability in common mode
comparators as well as well-known sampling uncertainty of
D flip-flops [4], metastability in latch circuits [10], themal
noise [1], and edge racing in even-stage inverter rings [3] are
just a couple of examples. Oscillator-based and metastable
TRNGs have the simplest and largest circuits, receptively
with oscillator-based TRNGs suffering from reported poor
randomness [11]. Entropy sources like thermal noise in filed-
effect transistors (FETs) is strong function of temperature
and its noise power is relatively weak, therefore, not only
harvesting the noise takes considerable efforts but extensive
considerations are required to ensure minimum correlation in
the output [4].
To evaluate randomness, the National Institute of Stan-
dards and Technology (NIST) in the U.S. developed a set of
standard statistical tests, which provides a reasonably solid
verification ground [12]. However, relying solely on NIST’s
tests comes with an increasingly troublesome consequences
and more attention should be drawn to desirable character-
istics of a source of entropy. For instance, if an adversarial
access or manipulation of environmental factors results in
extracting information or successful modeling (for example,
using machine learning), there is a real risk of vulnerability.
Environmental factors can be listed as, but not limited to,
noise, radiation and temperature. A TRNG should ideally
be insensitive to environmental factors. Noise amplification,
temperature (in case of thermal noise), and dependency on
process variation are a few factors that could potentially make
TRNGs predictable through creating undesirable bias towards
0 or 1 in the output bit stream, therefore, making the system
more vulnerable to a range of attacks [13]. While it is possible
to mitigate dependency of TRNGs to environmental factors
by choosing stronger entropy sources, we require noise and
temperature aware circuits to harvest the entropy with limited
bias imposed on the output. For instance, it could be argued
that single event upsets are likely to occur in SRAM’s power-
up metastability-based random number generator (RNG) under
radiation [14].
Random telegraph noise (RTN) has recently attracted a
growing attention as probabilistic and relatively strong source
of noise [15]. RTN has been studied in various types of
devices including FETs [16–19], carbon nanotube transistors
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2(CNTs) [20] and broad class of resistive switching mem-
ories [21–26]. Among these technologies, resistive memory
devices have been observed to have one of the strongest RTN
signals, hence, circuits presented RTN-based TRNGs using
nanometer scale resistive memory devices have been shown
without the need for amplification [27]. One of the main open
challenges of dealing with random telegraph signals (RTSs)
for TRNGs is effective extraction of the noise for maximizing
randomness in the output and at the same time, minimizing
disturbance and systematic bias mainly due to environmental
factors discussed earlier.
This paper presents effective harvesting circuit of stochas-
tic RTN in amorphous SrTiO3 (a-STO)-based valency
change reduction-oxidation (redox) resistive switching mem-
ories (VCM-ReRAMs) and implementation of an innovative
ReRAM-based TRNG. This paper emphasis that advantages
of differential readout operation, like a metastability-based
TRNG in Ref. [28], in increasing noise immunity, higher
linearity, relative immunity against temperature and radiation
(due to microscale sizes) for TRNG applications outweigh
potential increase in area compared to single-ended readout
approach reported in literature [27, 29–32]. We evaluate ran-
domness quality of output bit stream not only based on NIST
tests but also using machine learning attacks. We also showed
clear superiority of the proposal differential RTN readout
circuitry over those reported in the literature.
In the next section, Section II, we provide an overview
of noise and stochastic RTN in our ReRAMs. Section III
briefly describe device material stack and fabrication process.
Section IV discusses RTN characteristics in our devices and
the significance of hardware-based random number generators
(RNGs), including the proposed RTN harvesting circuitry. Sec-
tion V reports the proposed TRNG evaluations and immunity
against environmental factors and predictive machine learning
attacks.
II. FROM RANDOM TELEGRAPHIC NOISE TO RANDOM
NUMBER GENERATORS
In this section, we describe the role of noise in electronic
devices, RTN characteristics in a-STO-based VCM-ReRAM
and review crucial requirements of designing a TRNG.
A. Noise
Noise is traditionally considered as an unwanted nondeter-
ministic phenomenon that if not suppressed, it corrupts signal
and reduces signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). Noise power can be
written as
∆Pnoise
∆f
= 1/fα. (1)
This is called flicker noise or 1/f noise because its noise
spectrum obeys the law as reciprocal of the frequency (1/fα),
where the exponent α is very close to unity.
In case of ReRAM, noise data showing α is approaching
2 for high-resistance state (HRS) as shown in Fig. 1(a) at
room temperature, where ReRAM conductance is measured
by applying 125 mV potential across a device, significantly
weaker than potentials required to induce enough current into
the ReRAM device to impose SET switching (see Fig. 1(b)).
(a)
(b)
Figure 1: Noise and current-voltage characteristics in ReRAM
samples. (a) Normalized PSD measured from one of our a-
STO-based ReRAM sample programmed at high-resistance
state (HRS). ReRAM’s PDS follows ∼1/f2 slope as reported
in a number of literature. (b) Current-voltage (I–V ) bipolar-
switching signature of fabricated ReRAM. This measurement
shows only 50 SET/RESET cycles, with Ic representing
compliance current set during the measurement. Highlighted
voltage ranges show, voltages at which readout operations have
been carried out in this paper and voltages at which SET and
RESET switchings occur due to cycle-to-cycle and device to
device variation.
Random telegraphic or “popcorn” noise is a random low
frequency fluctuation of conductance that appears in two or
more current levels. It is believed to be the result of random
carrier capture (electron trapped in a local defect) / emission
(empty defect) in/from one or more bistable defects [33].
Like many other physical phenomena, it could be described
as statistical probability of overcoming a transition barrier
from capture to emission or vice versa. Temporal behavior of
RTN in ReRAMs is repeatedly shown to be highly random,
therefore, it could be used as random source for generating
random bits, which is the aim of this work. RTN is often
observed in a low frequency regimes of scaled devices and is
frequently described as circuit “designer’s nightmare” [34].
RTN behavior could be described with a number of time
constants, shown in this paper with τ .
Measured RTN behaviors of a ReRAM at HRS for two
different READ voltages at room temperature are shown in
Fig. 2(a). It is shown that switching time between differ-
3ent RTN levels (a single trap system here), is a stochastic
phenomenon. In frequency domain (Fig. 1(a)), Lorentzian
spectrum, 1/f2, starting at corner frequency, fRTS. The corner
frequency is strong function of τL and τH, which are periods
of time a career spent in the low and high levels, respectively
(in case of a single trap system here). fRTS can therefore be
written as
fRTS =
1
2piτRTS
=
1
2pi
( 1
τL
+
1
τH
)
. (2)
PSD then can be calculated by the Wiener-Khintchine formula
by taking Fourier transform of the noise-noise autocorrela-
tion [35],
SRTS(f) =
4∆I2
τH + τL
τRTS
2
1 + (2pifτRTS)2
, (3)
where ∆I represents amplitude of a random telegraphic pulse.
Fig. 2(c) illustrates 3D map of an in-situ scanning probe
microscopy of our device, highlighting nano-filaments. One
or multiple defects/traps alongside these nano-filaments are
commonly believed to be the origin of RTN in ReRAM
devices. In addition to probabilistic nature of these capture and
emission in/from these defects, creation and rupture of these
nano-filaments are also a probabilistic phenomenon causing
considerable cycle-to-cycle (programming) conductance fluc-
tuation [36]. Therefore, an extremely rich degree of stochastic-
ity is available to ReRAM-based TRNGs to harvest [37–39].
B. Random Telegraphic Noise Characteristics
RTS noise is often observed in very small specimen such
as microscale pn-juctions and FETs [40], metal contacts,
e.g. metal-insulator-metal tunnel junctions [41] and nan-
otubes [42]. Before we introduce RTN harvesting circuitry, it
is important to investigate RTS characteristics of our fabricated
ReRAMs.
We use time leg plots (TLP) to visualize current levels and
transition between them [43], as shown in Fig. 3, the TLP can
be drawn by plotting the RTS data sequence on an x plane
versus a delayed data sequence on an y plane. In case of a
single trap, TLP clearly shows carrier transition from emission
to capture (LH) and from capture to emission (HL) in upper-
left and bottom-right corners, respectively. We also highlight
the other corners as HH and LL for those situation that a carrier
stays in captured or the trap stays vacant. The figure shows HH
clearly stands out as having the most number of appearance
in the acquired data. While switching for capture (LH) and
emission (HL) occurs at random times, the balance of color
could tell a lot about predictability of RTN-based TRNG which
does not have sophisticated post-processing. This important
piece of analysis is missing in a number of literature reporting
ReRAM’s RTN-based TRNGs including Refs. [27, 29].
Here we not only rely on our data but also reporting
numerous experimental evidence reported in Refs. [22, 31–
33, 44, 45] that is difficult to activate and control ReRAM’s
RTN amplitude, average frequency and stability. While these
reports could potentially undermine previous ReRAM-based
RTN works, they unanimously endorse that amplitude and av-
erage frequency of the RTN source cannot be predicted in both
(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 2: ReRAM’s RTN characteristic. (a) RTN represented
in time domain at two READ voltages. Insets show RTN
amplitudes. (b) Random telegraphic signal (RTS) amplitude
difference between high and low levels of RTN signal. (c)
3D map of conductive nano-filaments extracted from an in-
situ scanning probe microscopy (SPM). Defects (traps) are
believed to be alongside these filaments.
high-resistance and low-resistance states (HRS and LRS). It
has also been shown that RTN in HRS is activated/deactivated
without predictability [45].
We argue that if proper harvesting technique is used to take
advantage of the uncontrollable nature of RTN, RTN could
be one of the most true sources of randomness in solid-state
devices. Our data, presented in Figs. 2(a) and 3 confirms that
average frequency of RTN in our devices is uncontrollable and
achieving a balanced TLP is extremely difficult, if not impos-
sible. However, as shown in Fig. 2(a), it can be concluded
that we have a relatively stable control over RTN amplitude
by maintaining a solid control of VREAD at the nonlinear HRS
curve shown in Fig. 1(b). As it is expected, studies also suggest
strong correlation between low-frequency noise amplitude in
4Figure 3: Observed RTS behaviors in a number of a-STO-
based ReRAMs. A time trace and time-lag plot (TLP) of
RTS is presented that shows four distinct transitions. LH and
HL represent low-to-high (capture) and high-to-low (emission)
level transitions, respectively, which are demonstrations of
capture and emission of carriers in a trap/defect. HH and LL
are cases that no transition takes place.
oxide-based ReRAMs and resistance values [46]. The method
for imposing this control using a negative feedback loop is
described in Section IV-A.
C. Random Telegraphic Signals and Environmental and Pro-
cess Factors
To get a clear picture of RTS in ReRAM-based TRNGs,
we analyze several characteristics of RTS dependence on
important factors including a device size, applied potential and
temperature.
For scaled FET devices relative RTS amplitude in drain
current (∆Id/I) has shown to decrease by increasing channel
area (W×L) [47, 48]. Similarly, area-dependence in ReRAMs
is a strong [22, 46]. ReRAMs show increased RTS amplitude
at higher resistances and smaller devices [24, 49, 50].
In terms of applied potential-dependence of RTS, our mea-
surement suggests two main changes in RTN when VREAD
is swept. In Fig. 4(a), we observed the transition rate, cor-
responding to the average capture and emission times (τH
and τL) are dependent on the applied voltage, which in effect
means a different conductance point on HRS curve in Fig. 1(b).
The noise power, however, almost follow similar trend at all
READ voltages when normalized trend is considered to the
VREAD (see Fig 4(b)). Normalized PSD is the most important
factor as in reality, normalized PSD identifies SNR. The rise
in applied voltage and consequently the increase in absolute
value of current passing through the device resulted in steady
decrease in τH, capture time, while τL, emission time, shows
a much weaker correlation as shown in Fig. 4(c).
Temperature dependency of RTS is another important factor.
We found that, while RTS amplitude (∆I) is maintained
approximately constant, absolute current (I) grows over the
temperature range, as expected. This trend shows in Fig. 4(d).
As suggested in literature (Ref. [24]), this indicates that
RTN is most likely initiated from the same defect(s) during
the measurement. We also extracted τH and τL at different
temperatures. Fig 4(e) clearly shows a rapid descent in both τH
and τL as temperature rises, which implies the RTS fluctuation
becomes more frequent, yet timing remain stochastic.
(a)
(b) (c)
(d) (e)
Figure 4: Voltage and Temperature dependence of RTS. (a)
Time trace of RTS in a-STO-based ReRAM at different
VREADs. Increased RTS transition rate by rising VREAD is
observed. (b) Normalized PSD when VREAD is swept from
25 mV to 125 mV. Normalized PSDs at different VREADs
follow the similar trend. (c) Average capture, τH, and emission,
τL, times are shown. τH demonstrates significant decrease
while τL shows almost no voltage dependency. It implies
that RTS level transition rate can be adjusted by controlling
VREAD. (d) Relationship between ∆I/I and temperature. (e)
Thermal activation RTS fluctuation represented by average
time constants decrement of τH and τL at higher temperature.
III. a-STO-BASED RERAM FABRICATION
Before presenting RTN harvesting circuitry and proposed
TRNG, it is important to describe our fabrication steps.
Using standard photolithography we fabricated a stack of the
following material layers. A 20 nm a Pt and 5 nm Ti adhesion
layers are deposited on a SiO2/Si substrate using electron-
5beam evaporation to define the bottom electrode (BE). A 22
nm amorphous SrTiO3 (a-STO) thin film was sputtered on
top of the BE. Finally, a 20 nm/10 nm of Pt/Ti film was
deposited by electron-beam evaporation as top electrode (TE).
The whole deposition is completed at room temperature. Our
fabricated ReRAMs are attributed to localized accumulation
of oxygen vacancies along the defect structure across the
device [51, 52]. Oxygen vacancy is known to facilitate the
formation and rupture of nano-filaments, which is responsible
for the bipolar switching between HRS and LRS [52]. Elec-
trical characterization of ReRAM and measurement data was
gathered with Keithley 4200 Semiconductor Characterization
System (SCS). Full details on the electrical, electroforming,
and switching characteristics of the a-STO memristors can be
found in Refs. [51–53].
IV. A RERAM’S TRN-BASED TRUE RANDOM NUMBER
GENERATOR
In this section, we describe our harvesting circuit for a
ReRAM-based TRNG for which RTS is used as a source of
randomness.
A. Proposed ReRAM-based TRNG
Fig. 5(a) presents a differential readout (harvesting) circuit
for ReRAM’s RTSs. Negative feedbacks to amplifiers from
nodes X and Y, help to regulate VX and VY at VREAD.
Loop bandwidth identifies the frequency that VX and VY
are fixed. While our measurement done on a pair ReRAMs
which are placed both sides, it is also possible that ReRAMs
are put in parallel, which to some extend helps stability of
the loops by reducing overall ReRAM part resistance. The
clamping amplifier compares the potential, VX to the applied
bias, VREAD with a negative feedback loop. Rapid RTN jumps
would result sufficient ∆V at either VX or VY, which means
the loop needs some time to settle. Due to random fluctuation
on X and Y in time, the proposed TRNG is shown to be
capable of generating true randomness in the output according
to our NIST and machine learning evaluation.
The differential nature of this TRNG results in effective
supply voltage (VDD) and VREAD noise rejection. Temperature
that is shown to increase RTS activities also influence both
ReRAM branches in approximately similar manner, therefore,
its impact is significantly suppressed at the circuit level.
Radiation attacks or delivering RF energy to the chip would
also affect both branches similarly due to small footprint of
this TRNG (like many other on-chip differential TRNGs).
Our analysis show, our differential TRNG circuit’s sup-
ply rejection ratio (PSRR) at 100 Hz is almost an order
of magnitude greater than PSRR of its single ended rival
presented in Refs. [27, 29]. VREAD’s noise rejection, which
is considered common-mode for the whole circuit due to
circuit configuration, is also very strong in our implementation.
In single ended circuit, a reference voltage is in charge of
determining the output bit, which could easily be tampered
by application of RF energy, temperature or other forms of
delivering energy and/or noise to the system. Our proposed
(a)
(b)
Figure 5: The proposed ReRAM-based TRNG circuit. (a) A
differential circuit is proposed that utilizes two amplifiers
in negative feedback loop configuration in order to regulate
VREAD solidly. Identical number of one or more parallel
ReRAMs are placed in both branches, which act as sources
of RTS. The differential nature of this configuration results
in effective rejection of supply voltage and VREAD noise,
hence, reduced bias in the random output. (b) LFSR-based
post-processing circuit is a digital circuitry, which by itself (if
output is fed to input) implements a pseudo-RNG.
differential circuit take advantages of all other known differ-
ential signaling benefits such as higher output swings, simpler
biasing and higher linearity. Our analysis also shows offset
on the negative feedback loop amplifiers is likely to affect
both similarly due to the fact that they are sitting in very
close proximity of each other. It is important to note that
transmission gate addressing elements are removed in Fig. 5(a)
presentation for the sake of simplicity.
Since the signal is taken differentially, an amplifier that
senses differential signals is required at the output. This is
shown by the module taking VX and VY and provides digital
signal S at the output, which then is fed to a post-processing
unit, shown in Fig. 5(b). We evaluated entropy before and after
the post-processing unit. The entropy of bit-stream signal S is
0.97, which is significantly higher than those of single-ended
method at 0.93. Post-processing improves the entropy to 0.99,
closer to ideal entropy of 1.00.
Another way to examine randomness is the autocorrelation.
We plot autocorrelations of single-ended implementation and
the proposed TRNG with and without post-processing. Results
shown in Fig. 6(a) indicates existence of significantly higher
autocorrelation in single-ended RTN harvesting circuits, which
could be the outcome of a systematic bias generated as the
6result of noise on the supply, reference voltage and tempera-
ture fluctuations. The sequence generated by our differential
method, on the other hand, produces almost no autocorrelation,
under identical condition.
The effectiveness of the introduced post-processing unit
could be seen in the autocorrelation analysis, where a clear
improvement can be observed in Fig. 6(a). A way to qual-
itatively analyze randomness is to visualize some portion
of random data as bitmap. Before we report our formal
randomness analysis in the next section, Figs. 6(b) and 6(c)
could qualitatively represent that no obvious pattern could be
observed at the output of post-processing unit.
(a)
(b) (c)
Figure 6: (a) Autocorrelation comparison between single-
ended and differential RTN harvesting implementations. The
differential method is tested with and without a post-
processing unit and the outcome is clearly in favor of dif-
ferential RTN harvesting technique with post-processing unit.
(b) Bitmap generated using a portion of data, more than 217
bits, at the output S in Fig 5(a). (c) Shows the same number
of bits after post-processing (see Fig 5(b)).
V. RNG RANDOMNESS EVALUATION
To formally investigate the degree of randomness of our
TRNG, entropy analysis and NIST statistical tests are reported
in this section. In addition, we include a predictive machine
learning evaluation to estimate the level of predictability in
our TRNG.
Here, we use statistical test suit developed by the US’s
National Institute of Standard and Technology (NIST) in order
to evaluate randomness of our TRNG. The test suite includes
a total of 15 different tests with two similar tests running
on different directions of bit-stream; hence, 17 tests [54].
Our ReRAM-based TRNG successfully passed all tests with
a significance level of 0.01. Tests, outcome and p-values are
shown in Table I.
We also run prediction test using recurrent neural network
(RNN) with long short-term memory (LSTM). Multiple mea-
surements show an average prediction rate between 49.790%
and 51.385%, which shows unpredictability of our TRNG’s
bit-sequence is close to an ideal level.
Table I: Successful Pass Results of NIST Test on ReRAM-
based TRNG.
Statistical Test Result p-value
Frequency Pass 0.370
Block Frequency Pass 0.063
Cumulative sum (Forward) Pass 0.319
Cumulative sum (Backward) Pass 0.506
Runs Pass 0.868
Longest Run of 1’s Pass 0.246
Rank Pass 0.779
FFT Pass 0.119
Nonoverlapping Templates Pass 0.011∗
Overlapping Templates Pass 0.597
Universal Pass 0.637
Approximate Entropy Pass 0.846
Random Excursions Pass 0.069∗
Random Excisions Variant Pass 0.049∗
Serial Pass 0.417
Serial Pass 0.082
Linear Complexity Pass 0.787
∗Lowest
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a novel and effective way
of generating true random bit sequences by introducing a
differential random telegraphic noise harvesting technique.
This approach is less sensitive to common-mode noises (e.g,
noise on supply and reference voltages) and potentially more
immune to temperature disturbances and electromagnetic radi-
ation. We have shown that autocorrelation in reported single-
ended RTN readout could increase significantly in presence
of common-mode noise and fluctuations of environmental
factors. We have reported successful evaluation using standard
true randomness tests and the use of advanced deep learning
techniques.
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